Introduction

In the aftermath of World War Two, the Soviet Union and the United States became locked in a battle to conquer the last frontier: outer space. Following the fifty years of battle on Earth during the Cold War, the rival nations became obsessed with exploring and inhabiting space. This became known as the Space Race (Adams & Balfour, 1998, pp. 300-314). The implications of this rivalry extended far beyond a competition to hold and maintain an upper hand. Unbeknownst to all, this competition for the upper hand would culminate in organizational negligence and dire shortcomings in procedural conduct.

Following an extended period of global conflict and economic crises, the nation had developed a prevailing defeatist attitude and apprehension in their government. In midst of these global upheavals, national pride and harmony had unsurprisingly become less prioritized within the policies and agendas of the federal government. On the heels of the Apollo launch, America had achieved their mission of landing on the moon and the future planning encompassed exploration and advancement. This raised budgetary concerns because Apollo had been a monumental stride in science but expensive, and the non-reusable nature of the Apollo could not remain a sustainable practice due to its financial constraints. As a result, an especially designated engineering laboratory was created within NASA specializing in cost reducing innovation with the mechanical aspects of the equipment with the goal being to create a sustainable economic model with reusable technology (Salem Press, 1999, p. 1228). As part of this initiative, Congress approved and President Reagan authorized the allocation of 5.5 billion dollars to NASA in creating a reusable space shuttle distinct from its Columbia shuttle predecessor (D.C., 1986, pp. ii-x). The principal component presented to Congress for the approval of these funds was the promise of consecutive launches per year nearing about twenty flights per year. The expectation in the creation of the Challenger space shuttle was an innovative shuttle that was not only reusable but had undergone structural changes from Columbia making it lightweight and allowing for an increased level of payloads. Payloads were NASA's initial economic model in which private research or scientific firms would pay NASA to take certain equipment into orbit such as satellites. The reusable aspect of the Challenger shuttle comprised of the detachable boosters which would aide in entering Orbit, then detach and fall into the Atlantic Ocean where they could be recovered, repaired, and reused in the next launch (Wright & Owen, 2011). This aspect was especially compelling in the global politics sphere because even Russia had yet to use boosters due to the safety issues extending the upper hand to America in the space race (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001).

In the aftermath of the success of the Apollo launch and several other astronauts only space missions, NASA had become an unexpected beacon of national pride and hope. Coupled with the stellar safety record of the previous launches in which zero lives had been lost during flight, NASA initiated a transformative campaign introducing the idea of civilian flights beginning with the 1986 Challenger space shuttle (Adams & Balfour, 1998, pp. 300-314). In addition to the six crew members required on the flight, the Challenger was set in motion to be the first civilian flight with teacher Christa McAuliffe scheduled to be on board. The significance of McAuliffe's addition to the crew extended beyond the public interest as civilians, it represented a contemporary and reformed America following the social strides made during the Civil Rights Movement during the decade prior. A society on the mend, there was a major initiative within the government for wider inclusivity and opportunity for all people in America. In fact, in 1978, news outlets all over America raved and gushed over NASA's new campaign for diversity, with reports such as, "[NASA] chose the 35 persons who will ride the space shuttle into orbit and back in the 1980s. Among them are three blacks, one oriental, and six women". The 1980s was a decade of many firsts for NASA in their contribution towards a diverse and representative workforce. In 1983, Sally Ride became the first woman to enter the orbit preceded by earlier years in which Asian and Black Americans were seen in the NASA space shuttles (Salem Press, 1999, p. 1228). Combined with the success of the Columbia space shuttles, it seemed that after a long time of uncertainty, Americans had found the common ground that united them all.

The Undoing

With the level of pride that NASA embodied and their symbolic significance to the government and the public came a new crushing wave of pressure put forth by a cumulative number of factors, all combining to create the perfect catalyst for disaster.

External Pressures

As a result of the congressional and presidential budget hearings, the upper administration had been a knowing part of the misrepresented broadcast that assured the government that NASA would be able to carry out flights in numbers between nineteen and twenty-four per year, amounting to about two launches every month (NASA & Rodney, 1988, pp. 40-53). As would be expected, in practice, it became abundantly clear that not only was this expectation impractical but could be potentially dangerous as this promise made to Congress purposefully left out the details of weather implications as well as mechanical delays that would inevitably delay the scheduled launches and lead NASA to fall behind an impossible schedule. The pressure on administration to meet these deadlines to uphold their federal budget disseminated into all levels of the organization to the engineering workers and impacted the regulation of safety practices. Even when concerns were raised by lower ranking engineers, social hierarchies within the organization took precedence and drowned out these complaints from ever truly being made clear to the top-most-ranking NASA officials. Media outlets, taking advantage of the newfound public interest in the space program, released inflammatory articles and broadcasts that further intensified the managerial pressures trickling down through all levels of workers involved. NASA was accused of buying in Congress, a term that signifies over exaggeration of possible outcomes to secure funding (Junge & Leckart, 2020). To ward off these accusations, NASA agreed to allow Senator Jake Garn to join in a shuttle launch as a supervisor and boost their public image since he had been part of the congressional budget decision (Adams & Balfour, 1998, pp. 300-314). Frustrated with the callous attitudes of management towards technical details of these launches, Bob Ebling began the integral paper trail of failures in leadership that eventually would be the pivotal factor in holding the right parties responsible. Ebling, one of the head engineers involved in the Challenger, sent an expository memo to the Vice President of Morton Thiokol only a year prior, in 1985. In this memo, Ebling revealed that not only were concerns raised and communicated to the NASA administration, but the pattern of NASA headquarters being aware of the red flag raised and overlooked. Unwilling to back down from maintaining the proposed schedule, NASA continuously demanded production from Thiokol and due to the nature of their contract with the government, Thiokol was unable to refuse equipment without NASA's approval even if issues were known by all parties involved.

Known Vulnerabilities

In midst of these bureaucratic hassles, engineers such as Ebling were becoming increasingly concerned with NASA's willful oversight despite the engineers raising persistent concerns regarding a pattern of technical faults that had recently become patent in the previous launches with the Columbia shuttles. Although manufactured by Morton Thiokol, a private contractor, the innovative boosters of the space shuttle were handled through NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (Boisjoly et al., 1989, pp. 217-230). Data from even before Challenger, as early as 1984 showed documented instances of erosion in the boosters following their detachment and retrieval from the ocean (Adams & Balfour, 1998, pp. 300-314). Thiokol's periodic maintenance tests supported these findings, but further maintenance was postponed by NASA as it would require a brief pause in the flight launches and set them further behind on their schedule to Congress. Richard Cook, a research analyst involved in the booster program had received documentation from Thiokol's engineers revealing definitive sightings of complete and partial erosion found within the boosters in 1985. Further details revealed that there had been signs of burning within the boosters as well as soot present when the test or actual launches were carried out in colder temperatures. This conclusion was reached after Thiokol engineers had investigated their findings through the boosters' manufacturing guides. Their explanation claimed that cold temperatures would lead to the plastic in the O-rings of the boosters to become stiff and lead to degradation. This would eventually amount to a complete burning through of the first O-rings all the way to the secondary contingency O-rings. Encapsulated by a field joint, the O-ring issue presented the eventual possibility of the seal joint eroding, allowing for searing hot fuel to leak outside and lead to an explosion during detachment of the boosters. NASA leadership involved in this decision included Director the Marshall Center, Dr. Bill Lucas as well as the manager of the booster program, Lawrence Mulloy. The collective justification presented by NASA expressed that there was knowledge of these issues but there was yet to be a statistical correlation found and there was not an urgent need to ground all flights. Their justification pointed out that they were in the process of learning more about the problem and it would have been excessive to stop their work and work on an issue they weren't even positive existed. Lucas and Mulloy agreed to sign off a waiver claiming that the flights were to be launched as planned to await further research which was to then be followed by the appropriate corrective measures (NASA & Rodney, 1988, pp. 40-53).

Events of the Accident

As public excitement grew, training for the Challenger crew members intensified, and the internal concerns of the logistical defects became undeniably salient in the days and the decisions leading up to the eventual disaster that would disturb the nation and its sentiments for years to come.

In Preparation

As all seven crew members prepared last minute training exercises leading into the launch, family members as well as they themselves entered a period of quarantine to avoid infection or viruses in the final days before the launch. Though acted with comforting intentions, NASA had trained the first civilian crew member, Christa, with the implication that there were minimal security risks involved and that the experience would be like that of flying in a commercial airline. The commander of the Challenger STS-51L mission, Dick Scobee circumvented the training provided by NASA to conduct a thorough walk through and miniature training session with Christa as a way of preparing all crew members and to provide the reality of the dangers associated with this mission (Junge & Leckart, 2020). Although originally scheduled to be launched on the 26th of January 1986, this date proved unfeasible due to inclement weather that had been heavily forecasted yet presented as acceptable for flying conditions. With the sentiment that a day had been wasted due to unnecessary precaution, the date for launch was then set for the following day. On January 27th, as crew members took final steps into the shuttle, an unforeseen issue arose fifteen minutes prior to launch involving the mechanics of the closing hatch. Further issues with the equipment required to fix the equipment required to launch caused unpredicted delays leading to the launch time being later than planned and coinciding with a cold front unsuitable for launching conditions. Once again, the date of the launch was delayed for the following day, escalating the frustration felt both by the spectators that had traveled states to witness the launch as well as government organizations that believed this to be a poor representation of their system. Disheartened and anxious to launch, the general attitude of NASA leadership officials was one of impatience and restlessness surrounding the launch. On the other hand, engineers closely familiar with the malfunction data adopted a general attitude of exasperated caution and anxiety because the conditions in which the next day would necessitate the launch to occur were equally as unfavorable, if not more, than the previous couple days. Administrative disconnect unfolded as one side of the agency pushed for launch and glory while the other half pleaded their case on all the risk heightening factors that prohibited them from proceeding with the launch. Subsequently, the night of the 27th, leading into the morning of the 28th, a program assessment review was conducted by Thiokol in which all supporting members of the mission were called upon to present their case for launching or postponing (Salem Press, 1999, p. 1228). The engineers as well as the experts of the field joints presented their data that showed the O-rings in the Challenger had never been field tested or launched in weather as cold as their conditions. Vice President of the Engineering department agreed with the recommendation that the launch be delayed until better weather. Thiokol emphasized that the contractor manufacturing the shuttles had established a previous condition that no launches were to be carried out in temperatures below 53 degrees F. Bordering on intimidating others in coercion, Mulloy on behalf of NASA presented the case that due to the lack of unequivocal data available, bad weather was not an additional risk being taken that hadn't been previously discussed, vetted, and disclosed (Adams & Balfour, 1998, pp. 300-314). Influenced by Mulloy's domineering attitude, the purpose of this meeting diverged into more so a liability strategy session in the probable case that they would encounter issues requiring an analysis of their decision-making regimen. As a result, when time came for final votes to reach a decisive conclusion, Mulloy only accounted for the judgements of the executive title holders in reaching a verdict and disregarded the attitudes of the engineers and technicians lower in the bureaucratic hierarchy. By 11:45 P.M. of January 27th, Shuttle Booster Vice President at Thiokol, Joe Kilminster had signed and written the document explaining the verdict of the commission to launch, its contents following Mulloy's arguments so closely, many of the present personnel sensed hesitant compliance to Mulloy due to the disparity in power between the two individuals (D.C., 1986, pp. ii-x).

The Launch

In the early morning hours of January 28th, as support personnel arrived to prepare all equipment for launch, they came across a new problem. The water pipes had been left to drain out slowly overnight to avoid burst pipes and combined with the below freezing temperatures, the water had all turned to ice jammed on the surface of all launching equipment. Once again, conversations on delaying the launch stirred up and a decision was made for a short-term delay. Instead of launching at the planned 8:10 a.m., the launch would now occur at 9:38 a.m. Despite the delay, more time was required to fully de-ice the equipment and so there was another delay, pushing the launch time to 11:38 a.m. There was some welcome news provided in that the weather forecast had improved and despite the cold temperatures there was no forecast of rain, storms, or snow. From there on out, all seemed to flow perfectly. With launching procedures underway, ground control reported safety checks as all clear without any unexpected errors found. Furthermore, the main engine checks showed no issues and were followed by a seamless lift-off. The shuttle cleared the tower and headed downrange with thousands of Americans gathered to send them best wishes as well as family members watching with overflowing pride. At this point, ground control still reports all engines, fuel cells, and APUs to be running as planned, without any errors. Then, Commander Scobee is told by ground control to throttle up and as if almost out of nowhere, 74 seconds after launch, minutes away from entering the orbit, the shuttle begins to be engulfed in smoke and fragments of equipment that at first seem to be the normal procedure of the booster detaching for the Atlantic Ocean. The reality soon sets in with the witnessing of the shuttle explode, fragment, and begin to fall into the ocean. This is then confirmed by ground control as it is announced for all spectators that there has been a major malfunction.

Immediate Rescue and Response

Chief NASA engineer, Jay Greene immediately called for contingency procedures to fall into effect. Much like the rest of America, it was yet to be determined if there was any possibility of survival. To gather all relevant information and preserve records as well as mitigate the possibility of data tampering, ground control rooms went into lockdown. No one was allowed to leave the room, answer the phones, or even touch their computers in case of tampering with necessary information. Public statements were released by all major agencies such as Larry Speakes from the White House and Jesse Moore from NASA public affairs. Moore was the first to announce that no definitive signs of survivor were observed in the rescue and recovery operations while remaining almost comically vague and avoiding all questions. NASA put out a statement claiming that the accident was a result of unusual plume (Johnson Space Center, 1986). Onlookers stood in disbelief as parts and pieces fell into the Ocean, fluctuating between denial and acting. Immediate response from NASA left much to be desired with a reductive statement calling the event a catastrophic failure in which several issues had occurred. It would be later revealed that rescue operations were not cleared to enter and start up their mission. At the time, family members of the seven crew members as well as friends and well-wishers watched rescue teams stand by idly while the crew members neared certain death. Many family members later interviewed about this moment recounted that they were still mindlessly positive that their loved ones had somehow survived the explosion and the fall into the ocean which further intensified their hopelessness at government inaction. This was cause of not only distrust and anger within the community, but it led to a long-lasting traumatic aftermath in which lack of action became the cornerstone of the grief felt by all Americans.

The Aftermath

The self-serving motivations at all levels of government that not only tolerated but benefited from withholding consolation communication and information from friends and families would later become clear in the investigations carried out following the crash. Though the onlookers had initially gathered to be united in celebration, they had become united in loss and sorrow. Widely televised to all Americans including school going children and crew members' families, Americans demanded answers and accountability even as powerful institutions displayed blatant shirking of responsibility.

Public Response

Due to the widespread nature of this historic event, it was watched live across America by all people. The diversity within the crew team was especially uniting across all Americans. The crew had included minority groups such as the second ever female astronaut, third ever Black astronaut, and First Asian American to launch into a mission with NASA. Not only did Americans feel pride and represented in the inclusivity of their societies, but these crew members were regular humans with everyday lives and sentiments surrounding the loss their family's suffered caused this to be an especially painful loss. While lives had been lost on Earth during training and testing, no astronaut lives had been lost so far during an official mission launch. NASA and related personnel that were ordered to immediately enact their contingency tasks were not afforded a moment of contemplation to process the enormous loss and grief they were experiencing at that very moment. All those involved in the launch were held to an impossible standard of being self-composed, especially all the employees that had been consistently vocal with their ever-increasing concerns in the launch.

Grief is a difficult experience regardless of its circumstances. Traumatic death involving young family members, passing away in unusual and highly public circumstances is especially traumatic for the family members especially since they were firsthand witnesses. For many of these loved ones, a prevailing sense of injustice will always remain a source of sorrow and anger. Closure during grief is instrumental in recovery and yet without the recovery of the bodies for months after and the void in information created an exceptionally difficult situation to move forward from. Additionally, narratives from the divers who were responsible for recovering the remains of the crew members have described the trauma that they have carried with them through their lives along with many other innocent employees implicated inaccurately who faced harassment for years after the disaster (Junge & Leckart, 2020).

Damages and Recovery Operations

The most psychologically significant damage following the crash was the loss of all seven crew members. There were several economic losses that had significant impacts on the organizations involved. Beginning with the shuttle itself, the $3 billion dollars invested into the shuttle were destroyed in the crash. In the process of restoration and redesign, an additional $300 million had to be allocated to resume the space shuttle program. Part of the reformation of the space shuttle program included a hiatus of the payload system which were originally sustaining the existence of this program (Bartholomew, 1986, pp. ii-x). This process was carried out over a period of two years during which no flights were launched, rendering the agency unable to access the funds that would have been generated during that time. Prior to the two-year break, $4 billion was invested in an additional launch base to be used by other branches of the government as well. These economic hardships were felt by the private sector contractors that lost major business contracts. Morton Thiokol, for example, lost wages and production as well as the loss of 200 employees and another 1400 being put on restrictive working hours. Another private storage contractor became an unsuspecting victim when a fire broke out in the facility (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001). Being stored in that facility was the unused Ammonium Perchlorate fuel from an outdated NASA contract that inadvertently facilitated fatal explosions, costing the lives of almost 400 people and the loss of over $100 million.

Presidential Investigations and Reports

In the months following the disaster, a special presidential commission was set up by President Reagan with former secretary of state Bill Rogers as the head of the commission. Seemingly an unusual candidate to lead the commission, it was later revealed that President Reagan aimed to control the narrative of the government's role in this disaster. The prevailing attitude being not to embarrass NASA and the government. The commission consisted of reputable experts such as Neil Armstrong and Nobel Prize laureate Richard Feyman. During the commission hearings, attempts were made to conceal the truth that mechanical vulnerabilities were made abundantly clear to all levels of leadership within NASA, going as far as claiming that no previous erosion had ever been witnessed in any of the test or actual launches. Subsequently, disheartened engineers and lower ranking officials became anonymous source of documents and data being made public, forcing Rogers' hand finally condemning practices of NASA rather than deflecting blame off the government and onto unforeseen circumstances. Brave acts were carried out by people such as Allan McDonald's revealing public comments, Sally Ride's handing over of non-declassified data proving a correlation between temperature and the boosters, and Richard Cook's leaking of official documents to the New York Times (Boisjoly et al., 1989, pp. 217-230). At the conclusion of this investigative commission, the consensus agreed that negligence and political intrusions were the cause of this disaster. Dr. Lucas and Mulloy were rightfully condemned by the Presidential commission for failing to maintain proper standards within the organization and their avoidable shortcomings that cost the lives of seven innocent people.

A Legacy

Although this would be one of the first times Americans experienced collective grief and trauma, this was certainly not the last. In the decades following this instrumental disaster in American aerospace history, many innovations were introduced that strengthened safety of all people involved and contributed to the stellar record of safety provisions enacted that have saved numerous lives since this disaster.

Technological Improvements

After these endangering events and faults within the technologies became exposed to everyone in the public and the agency alike, the lead engineer from Thiokol, Allan McDonald, was assigned to a task force that would specialize in the reconstruction of the boosters to reinforce safety into and out of orbit. Tests carried out with the implementation of these redevelopments provided exponentially better data. In 1988, the new and improved shuttle named Discovery was introduced with all the technological precautions that the Challenger disaster exposed. This new shuttle included reinforced field joints sealed with a fireproof substance that would prevent fuel leaking as well as exploding. This shuttle included triple reinforcement of the O-rings to act as fallback support in case of the first two burning through.

Systemic Reforms

In the wake of the tragedy, one thing became explicitly apparent in the systemic administration of the American government. Fear of retaliation within professional hierarchies and bureaucratic pressures were limiting variables for proper protocols and regulation. A culture embroiled in paying dues to the authorities had become the single most dangerous practice, leading to a severe lack in accountability and a system deficient of proper checks and balances. A proper professional culture that promotes collaboration and attentive regard rather than a system that's embedded in power dynamics will always yield safer and more efficient administrations when implemented at the proper areas at the proper time. Following the Challenger Disaster, a dire need for restructure within the agency prompted a complete redesign in which old leadership was replaced with the proper experts deserving of those positions. The redesign included an inverted and better system of hierarchy in which instead of the engineers working for non-expert government politicians, the engineers were handed the power of implementation and decision making, holding the officials accountable to the engineers, not vice versa. There have been disappointing events following the Challenger's tragedy that exposed the lack of retention within institutions yielding power. Lessons that should have been learnt proven fatal and leading to the loss of more innocent lives. Such is the incident of the Columbia disaster, which was a result of a culmination of factors and yet again the overarching factor being negligence on the part of officials despite warnings made clear by those in charge of the operations.

Lessons Carried Since

As recently as 2022, debris is still being discovered in the Atlantic Ocean from the Challenger crash. Today, NASA holds esteem and respect across America and has once again become a national emblem of pride and admiration. Since the initiation of those primary reforms, NASA has had an impressive history of safe space missions, with Challenger being one of only two launch disasters. Despite the innovations and lessons learned through these disasters, it is still important to acknowledge the loss and tragedy that millions of Americans faced and many of those individuals involved in the Challenger continue to live with the impact and grief of the disaster. It is important to recognize that these failures paved the way for learning and improvements, but their nature was still one that could have been avoided given the correct risk assessment protocols and systemic balance in power. Space exploration in modern time has become a mission of humanity rather than one of competition and conquering. If the current model of global collaboration and data sharing continues, outer space could encompass solutions beneficial to developing disasters such as climate change and theories contained within astrophysics. With the rise of private space exploration trending once again from powerful institutions such as SpaceX stands to threaten and reopen the possibility of these disasters occurring once again. We are already seeing private space flights becoming equated with a person's wealth and prestige within society. By continuing to take lessons from disasters such as the Challenger, mitigation techniques will inevitably be employed that limit profiteering at the expense of safety and precaution. Insights gained from these disasters can be extrapolated in various other issues such as climate change. Trending sentiments of denial and wilful ignorance are seeping their way into a level of law and policy in which they pose a significant threat to our future. If we, as a society, take the lessons we should have learned from this disaster, we would heed warnings and alarms being raised by those with expertise in these fields rather than those bureaucrats in power that stand to benefit from our ignorance. As a nation and as humans, it's imperative that we continue to assess our policies and ask ourselves if we have truly learned from our previous mistakes or are we simply waiting until the band-aid solution proves inadequate. These attitudes begin at microlevels and one person's undeterred mission to do the right thing can and has proven to be pivotal in creating a better future.

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